Chapter IX: Principal Causes Maintaining The Democratic Republic—Part IV
The Laws Contribute More To The Maintenance Of The Democratic Republic In The United States Than The Physical Circumstances Of The Country, And The Manners More Than The Laws
All the nations of America have a democratic state of society—Yet
democratic institutions only subsist amongst the Anglo-Americans—The
Spaniards of South America, equally favored by physical causes as the
Anglo-Americans, unable to maintain a democratic republic—Mexico,
which has adopted the Constitution of the United States, in the same
predicament—The Anglo-Americans of the West less able to maintain it
than those of the East—Reason of these different results.
I have remarked that the maintenance of democratic institutions in the
United States is attributable to the circumstances, the laws, and the
manners of that country /9-8/. Most Europeans are only acquainted with
the first of these three causes, and they are apt to give it a
preponderating importance which it does not really possess.
It is true that the Anglo-Saxons settled in the New World in a state of
social equality; the low-born and the noble were not to be found amongst
them; and professional prejudices were always as entirely unknown as the
prejudices of birth. Thus, as the condition of society was democratic,
the empire of democracy was established without difficulty. But this
circumstance is by no means peculiar to the United States; almost
all the trans-Atlantic colonies were founded by men equal amongst
themselves, or who became so by inhabiting them. In no one part of
the New World have Europeans been able to create an aristocracy.
Nevertheless, democratic institutions prosper nowhere but in the United
States.
The American Union has no enemies to contend with; it stands in the
wilds like an island in the ocean. But the Spaniards of South America
were no less isolated by nature; yet their position has not relieved
them from the charge of standing armies. They make war upon each other
when they have no foreign enemies to oppose; and the Anglo-American
democracy is the only one which has hitherto been able to maintain
itself in peace.
The territory of the Union presents a boundless field to human activity,
and inexhaustible materials for industry and labor. The passion of
wealth takes the place of ambition, and the warmth of faction is
mitigated by a sense of prosperity. But in what portion of the globe
shall we meet with more fertile plains, with mightier rivers, or with
more unexplored and inexhaustible riches than in South America?
Nevertheless, South America has been unable to maintain democratic
institutions. If the welfare of nations depended on their being placed
in a remote position, with an unbounded space of habitable territory
before them, the Spaniards of South America would have no reason to
complain of their fate. And although they might enjoy less prosperity
than the inhabitants of the United States, their lot might still be such
as to excite the envy of some nations in Europe. There are, however, no
nations upon the face of the earth more miserable than those of South
America.
Thus, not only are physical causes inadequate to produce results
analogous to those which occur in North America, but they are unable
to raise the population of South America above the level of European
States, where they act in a contrary direction. Physical causes do not,
therefore, affect the destiny of nations so much as has been supposed.
I have met with men in New England who were on the point of leaving a
country, where they might have remained in easy circumstances, to go to
seek their fortune in the wilds. Not far from that district I found
a French population in Canada, which was closely crowded on a narrow
territory, although the same wilds were at hand; and whilst the emigrant
from the United States purchased an extensive estate with the earnings
of a short term of labor, the Canadian paid as much for land as he would
have done in France. Nature offers the solitudes of the New World to
Europeans; but they are not always acquainted with the means of turning
her gifts to account. Other peoples of America have the same physical
conditions of prosperity as the Anglo-Americans, but without their laws
and their manners; and these peoples are wretched. The laws and manners
of the Anglo-Americans are therefore that efficient cause of their
greatness which is the object of my inquiry.
I am far from supposing that the American laws are preeminently good
in themselves; I do not hold them to be applicable to all democratic
peoples; and several of them seem to be dangerous, even in the United
States. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the American legislation,
taken collectively, is extremely well adapted to the genius of the
people and the nature of the country which it is intended to govern. The
American laws are therefore good, and to them must be attributed a large
portion of the success which attends the government of democracy in
America: but I do not believe them to be the principal cause of that
success; and if they seem to me to have more influence upon the social
happiness of the Americans than the nature of the country, on the other
hand there is reason to believe that their effect is still inferior to
that produced by the manners of the people.
The Federal laws undoubtedly constitute the most important part of the
legislation of the United States. Mexico, which is not less fortunately
situated than the Anglo-American Union, has adopted the same laws, but
is unable to accustom itself to the government of democracy. Some
other cause is therefore at work, independently of those physical
circumstances and peculiar laws which enable the democracy to rule in
the United States.
Another still more striking proof may be adduced. Almost all the
inhabitants of the territory of the Union are the descendants of a
common stock; they speak the same language, they worship God in the same
manner, they are affected by the same physical causes, and they obey the
same laws. Whence, then, do their characteristic differences arise?
Why, in the Eastern States of the Union, does the republican government
display vigor and regularity, and proceed with mature deliberation?
Whence does it derive the wisdom and the durability which mark its acts,
whilst in the Western States, on the contrary, society seems to be ruled
by the powers of chance? There, public business is conducted with an
irregularity and a passionate and feverish excitement, which does not
announce a long or sure duration.
I am no longer comparing the Anglo-American States to foreign nations;
but I am contrasting them with each other, and endeavoring to discover
why they are so unlike. The arguments which are derived from the nature
of the country and the difference of legislation are here all set aside.
Recourse must be had to some other cause; and what other cause can there
be except the manners of the people?
It is in the Eastern States that the Anglo-Americans have been longest
accustomed to the government of democracy, and that they have adopted
the habits and conceived the notions most favorable to its maintenance.
Democracy has gradually penetrated into their customs, their opinions,
and the forms of social intercourse; it is to be found in all the
details of daily life equally as in the laws. In the Eastern States
the instruction and practical education of the people have been most
perfected, and religion has been most thoroughly amalgamated with
liberty. Now these habits, opinions, customs, and convictions are
precisely the constituent elements of that which I have denominated
manners.
In the Western States, on the contrary, a portion of the same advantages
is still wanting. Many of the Americans of the West were born in the
woods, and they mix the ideas and the customs of savage life with the
civilization of their parents. Their passions are more intense; their
religious morality less authoritative; and their convictions less
secure. The inhabitants exercise no sort of control over their
fellow-citizens, for they are scarcely acquainted with each other. The
nations of the West display, to a certain extent, the inexperience
and the rude habits of a people in its infancy; for although they are
composed of old elements, their assemblage is of recent date.
The manners of the Americans of the United States are, then, the real
cause which renders that people the only one of the American nations
that is able to support a democratic government; and it is the influence
of manners which produces the different degrees of order and of
prosperity that may be distinguished in the several Anglo-American
democracies. Thus the effect which the geographical position of a
country may have upon the duration of democratic institutions is
exaggerated in Europe. Too much importance is attributed to legislation,
too little to manners. These three great causes serve, no doubt, to
regulate and direct the American democracy; but if they were to
be classed in their proper order, I should say that the physical
circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and the laws very
subordinate to the manners of the people. I am convinced that the most
advantageous situation and the best possible laws cannot maintain a
constitution in spite of the manners of a country; whilst the latter
may turn the most unfavorable positions and the worst laws to some
advantage. The importance of manners is a common truth to which study
and experience incessantly direct our attention. It may be regarded as
a central point in the range of human observation, and the common
termination of all inquiry. So seriously do I insist upon this head,
that if I have hitherto failed in making the reader feel the important
influence which I attribute to the practical experience, the habits,
the opinions, in short, to the manners of the Americans, upon the
maintenance of their institutions, I have failed in the principal object
of my work.
Whether Laws And Manners Are Sufficient To Maintain Democratic Institutions In Other Countries Besides America
The Anglo-Americans, if transported into Europe, would be obliged
to modify their laws—Distinction to be made between democratic
institutions and American institutions—Democratic laws may be conceived
better than, or at least different from, those which the American
democracy has adopted—The example of America only proves that it
is possible to regulate democracy by the assistance of manners and
legislation.
I have asserted that the success of democratic institutions in the
United States is more intimately connected with the laws themselves, and
the manners of the people, than with the nature of the country. But
does it follow that the same causes would of themselves produce the same
results, if they were put into operation elsewhere; and if the country
is no adequate substitute for laws and manners, can laws and manners
in their turn prove a substitute for the country? It will readily be
understood that the necessary elements of a reply to this question are
wanting: other peoples are to be found in the New World besides the
Anglo-Americans, and as these people are affected by the same physical
circumstances as the latter, they may fairly be compared together. But
there are no nations out of America which have adopted the same laws
and manners, being destitute of the physical advantages peculiar to the
Anglo-Americans. No standard of comparison therefore exists, and we can
only hazard an opinion upon this subject.
It appears to me, in the first place, that a careful distinction must
be made between the institutions of the United States and democratic
institutions in general. When I reflect upon the state of Europe, its
mighty nations, its populous cities, its formidable armies, and
the complex nature of its politics, I cannot suppose that even the
Anglo-Americans, if they were transported to our hemisphere, with
their ideas, their religion, and their manners, could exist without
considerably altering their laws. But a democratic nation may be
imagined, organized differently from the American people. It is not
impossible to conceive a government really established upon the will
of the majority; but in which the majority, repressing its natural
propensity to equality, should consent, with a view to the order and the
stability of the State, to invest a family or an individual with all
the prerogatives of the executive. A democratic society might exist, in
which the forces of the nation would be more centralized than they are
in the United States; the people would exercise a less direct and
less irresistible influence upon public affairs, and yet every citizen
invested with certain rights would participate, within his sphere,
in the conduct of the government. The observations I made amongst the
Anglo-Americans induce me to believe that democratic institutions of
this kind, prudently introduced into society, so as gradually to mix
with the habits and to be interfused with the opinions of the people,
might subsist in other countries besides America. If the laws of the
United States were the only imaginable democratic laws, or the most
perfect which it is possible to conceive, I should admit that the
success of those institutions affords no proof of the success of
democratic institutions in general, in a country less favored by natural
circumstances. But as the laws of America appear to me to be defective
in several respects, and as I can readily imagine others of the same
general nature, the peculiar advantages of that country do not prove
that democratic institutions cannot succeed in a nation less favored by
circumstances, if ruled by better laws.
If human nature were different in America from what it is elsewhere; or
if the social condition of the Americans engendered habits and opinions
amongst them different from those which originate in the same social
condition in the Old World, the American democracies would afford
no means of predicting what may occur in other democracies. If the
Americans displayed the same propensities as all other democratic
nations, and if their legislators had relied upon the nature of the
country and the favor of circumstances to restrain those propensities
within due limits, the prosperity of the United States would be
exclusively attributable to physical causes, and it would afford no
encouragement to a people inclined to imitate their example, without
sharing their natural advantages. But neither of these suppositions is
borne out by facts.
In America the same passions are to be met with as in Europe; some
originating in human nature, others in the democratic condition of
society. Thus in the United States I found that restlessness of heart
which is natural to men, when all ranks are nearly equal and the chances
of elevation are the same to all. I found the democratic feeling of envy
expressed under a thousand different forms. I remarked that the people
frequently displayed, in the conduct of affairs, a consummate mixture
of ignorance and presumption; and I inferred that in America, men
are liable to the same failings and the same absurdities as amongst
ourselves. But upon examining the state of society more attentively,
I speedily discovered that the Americans had made great and successful
efforts to counteract these imperfections of human nature, and to
correct the natural defects of democracy. Their divers municipal laws
appeared to me to be a means of restraining the ambition of the citizens
within a narrow sphere, and of turning those same passions which might
have worked havoc in the State, to the good of the township or the
parish. The American legislators have succeeded to a certain extent in
opposing the notion of rights to the feelings of envy; the permanence
of the religious world to the continual shifting of politics; the
experience of the people to its theoretical ignorance; and its practical
knowledge of business to the impatience of its desires.
The Americans, then, have not relied upon the nature of their country to
counterpoise those dangers which originate in their Constitution and
in their political laws. To evils which are common to all democratic
peoples they have applied remedies which none but themselves had
ever thought of before; and although they were the first to make the
experiment, they have succeeded in it.
The manners and laws of the Americans are not the only ones which may
suit a democratic people; but the Americans have shown that it would be
wrong to despair of regulating democracy by the aid of manners and of
laws. If other nations should borrow this general and pregnant idea from
the Americans, without however intending to imitate them in the peculiar
application which they have made of it; if they should attempt to fit
themselves for that social condition, which it seems to be the will of
Providence to impose upon the generations of this age, and so to escape
from the despotism or the anarchy which threatens them; what reason is
there to suppose that their efforts would not be crowned with success?
The organization and the establishment of democracy in Christendom is
the great political problem of the time. The Americans, unquestionably,
have not resolved this problem, but they furnish useful data to those
who undertake the task.
Importance Of What Precedes With Respect To The State Of Europe
It may readily be discovered with what intention I undertook the
foregoing inquiries. The question here discussed is interesting not only
to the United States, but to the whole world; it concerns, not a nation,
but all mankind. If those nations whose social condition is democratic
could only remain free as long as they are inhabitants of the wilds,
we could not but despair of the future destiny of the human race; for
democracy is rapidly acquiring a more extended sway, and the wilds are
gradually peopled with men. If it were true that laws and manners are
insufficient to maintain democratic institutions, what refuge would
remain open to the nations, except the despotism of a single individual?
I am aware that there are many worthy persons at the present time who
are not alarmed at this latter alternative, and who are so tired of
liberty as to be glad of repose, far from those storms by which it
is attended. But these individuals are ill acquainted with the
haven towards which they are bound. They are so deluded by their
recollections, as to judge the tendency of absolute power by what it was
formerly, and not by what it might become at the present time.
If absolute power were re-established amongst the democratic nations of
Europe, I am persuaded that it would assume a new form, and appear under
features unknown to our forefathers. There was a time in Europe when
the laws and the consent of the people had invested princes with almost
unlimited authority; but they scarcely ever availed themselves of it.
I do not speak of the prerogatives of the nobility, of the authority of
supreme courts of justice, of corporations and their chartered rights,
or of provincial privileges, which served to break the blows of the
sovereign authority, and to maintain a spirit of resistance in the
nation. Independently of these political institutions—which, however
opposed they might be to personal liberty, served to keep alive the love
of freedom in the mind of the public, and which may be esteemed to have
been useful in this respect—the manners and opinions of the nation
confined the royal authority within barriers which were not less
powerful, although they were less conspicuous. Religion, the affections
of the people, the benevolence of the prince, the sense of honor, family
pride, provincial prejudices, custom, and public opinion limited the
power of kings, and restrained their authority within an invisible
circle. The constitution of nations was despotic at that time, but their
manners were free. Princes had the right, but they had neither the means
nor the desire, of doing whatever they pleased.
But what now remains of those barriers which formerly arrested the
aggressions of tyranny? Since religion has lost its empire over the
souls of men, the most prominent boundary which divided good from evil
is overthrown; the very elements of the moral world are indeterminate;
the princes and the peoples of the earth are guided by chance, and none
can define the natural limits of despotism and the bounds of license.
Long revolutions have forever destroyed the respect which surrounded the
rulers of the State; and since they have been relieved from the burden
of public esteem, princes may henceforward surrender themselves without
fear to the seductions of arbitrary power.
When kings find that the hearts of their subjects are turned towards
them, they are clement, because they are conscious of their strength,
and they are chary of the affection of their people, because the
affection of their people is the bulwark of the throne. A mutual
interchange of good-will then takes place between the prince and the
people, which resembles the gracious intercourse of domestic society.
The subjects may murmur at the sovereign's decree, but they are grieved
to displease him; and the sovereign chastises his subjects with the
light hand of parental affection.
But when once the spell of royalty is broken in the tumult of
revolution; when successive monarchs have crossed the throne, so as
alternately to display to the people the weakness of their right and the
harshness of their power, the sovereign is no longer regarded by any as
the Father of the State, and he is feared by all as its master. If he
be weak, he is despised; if he be strong, he is detested. He himself is
full of animosity and alarm; he finds that he is as a stranger in his
own country, and he treats his subjects like conquered enemies.
When the provinces and the towns formed so many different nations in the
midst of their common country, each of them had a will of its own, which
was opposed to the general spirit of subjection; but now that all the
parts of the same empire, after having lost their immunities, their
customs, their prejudices, their traditions, and their names, are
subjected and accustomed to the same laws, it is not more difficult to
oppress them collectively than it was formerly to oppress them singly.
Whilst the nobles enjoyed their power, and indeed long after that power
was lost, the honor of aristocracy conferred an extraordinary degree of
force upon their personal opposition. They afford instances of men who,
notwithstanding their weakness, still entertained a high opinion of
their personal value, and dared to cope single-handed with the efforts
of the public authority. But at the present day, when all ranks are more
and more confounded, when the individual disappears in the throng, and
is easily lost in the midst of a common obscurity, when the honor of
monarchy has almost lost its empire without being succeeded by public
virtue, and when nothing can enable man to rise above himself, who shall
say at what point the exigencies of power and the servility of weakness
will stop?
As long as family feeling was kept alive, the antagonist of oppression
was never alone; he looked about him, and found his clients, his
hereditary friends, and his kinsfolk. If this support was wanting, he
was sustained by his ancestors and animated by his posterity. But
when patrimonial estates are divided, and when a few years suffice to
confound the distinctions of a race, where can family feeling be found?
What force can there be in the customs of a country which has changed
and is still perpetually changing, its aspect; in which every act of
tyranny has a precedent, and every crime an example; in which there
is nothing so old that its antiquity can save it from destruction, and
nothing so unparalleled that its novelty can prevent it from being done?
What resistance can be offered by manners of so pliant a make that they
have already often yielded? What strength can even public opinion have
retained, when no twenty persons are connected by a common tie; when
not a man, nor a family, nor chartered corporation, nor class, nor free
institution, has the power of representing or exerting that opinion;
and when every citizen—being equally weak, equally poor, and equally
dependent—has only his personal impotence to oppose to the organized
force of the government?
The annals of France furnish nothing analogous to the condition in which
that country might then be thrown. But it may more aptly be assimilated
to the times of old, and to those hideous eras of Roman oppression, when
the manners of the people were corrupted, their traditions obliterated,
their habits destroyed, their opinions shaken, and freedom, expelled
from the laws, could find no refuge in the land; when nothing protected
the citizens, and the citizens no longer protected themselves; when
human nature was the sport of man, and princes wearied out the clemency
of Heaven before they exhausted the patience of their subjects. Those
who hope to revive the monarchy of Henry IV or of Louis XIV, appear
to me to be afflicted with mental blindness; and when I consider the
present condition of several European nations—a condition to which all
the others tend—I am led to believe that they will soon be left with
no other alternative than democratic liberty, or the tyranny of the
Caesars.
And indeed it is deserving of consideration, whether men are to be
entirely emancipated or entirely enslaved; whether their rights are to
be made equal, or wholly taken away from them. If the rulers of society
were reduced either gradually to raise the crowd to their own level,
or to sink the citizens below that of humanity, would not the doubts of
many be resolved, the consciences of many be healed, and the community
prepared to make great sacrifices with little difficulty? In that case,
the gradual growth of democratic manners and institutions should be
regarded, not as the best, but as the only means of preserving freedom;
and without liking the government of democracy, it might be adopted
as the most applicable and the fairest remedy for the present ills of
society.
It is difficult to associate a people in the work of government; but it
is still more difficult to supply it with experience, and to inspire
it with the feelings which it requires in order to govern well. I grant
that the caprices of democracy are perpetual; its instruments are rude;
its laws imperfect. But if it were true that soon no just medium would
exist between the empire of democracy and the dominion of a single arm,
should we not rather incline towards the former than submit voluntarily
to the latter? And if complete equality be our fate, is it not better to
be levelled by free institutions than by despotic power?
Those who, after having read this book, should imagine that my
intention in writing it has been to propose the laws and manners of
the Anglo-Americans for the imitation of all democratic peoples, would
commit a very great mistake; they must have paid more attention to the
form than to the substance of my ideas. My aim has been to show, by the
example of America, that laws, and especially manners, may exist which
will allow a democratic people to remain free. But I am very far from
thinking that we ought to follow the example of the American democracy,
and copy the means which it has employed to attain its ends; for I
am well aware of the influence which the nature of a country and its
political precedents exercise upon a constitution; and I should regard
it as a great misfortune for mankind if liberty were to exist all over
the world under the same forms.
But I am of opinion that if we do not succeed in gradually introducing
democratic institutions into France, and if we despair of imparting to
the citizens those ideas and sentiments which first prepare them
for freedom, and afterwards allow them to enjoy it, there will be no
independence at all, either for the middling classes or the nobility,
for the poor or for the rich, but an equal tyranny over all; and I
foresee that if the peaceable empire of the majority be not founded
amongst us in time, we shall sooner or later arrive at the unlimited
authority of a single despot.
Notes
/3-1/
They only write in the papers when they choose to address
the people in their own name; as, for instance, when they are called
upon to repel calumnious imputations, and to correct a misstatement of
facts.
/3-2/
See Appendix P.
/3-3/
It may, however, be doubted whether this rational
and self-guiding conviction arouses as much fervor or enthusiastic
devotedness in men as their first dogmatical belief.
/5-1/
I here use the word magistrates in the widest sense in
which it can be taken; I apply it to all the officers to whom the
execution of the laws is intrusted.
/5-2/
See the Act of February 27, 1813. "General Collection of
the Laws of Massachusetts," vol. ii. p. 331. It should be added that the
jurors are afterwards drawn from these lists by lot.
/5-3/
See Act of February 28, 1787. "General Collection of the
Laws of Massachusetts," vol. i. p. 302.
/5-4/
It is needless to observe that I speak here of the
democratic form of government as applied to a people, not merely to a
tribe.
/5-5/
The word poor is used here, and throughout the remainder
of this chapter, in a relative, not in an absolute sense. Poor men in
America would often appear rich in comparison with the poor of Europe;
but they may with propriety by styled poor in comparison with their more
affluent countrymen.
/5-6/
The easy circumstances in which secondary functionaries
are placed in the United States result also from another cause, which
is independent of the general tendencies of democracy; every kind of
private business is very lucrative, and the State would not be served at
all if it did not pay its servants. The country is in the position of
a commercial undertaking, which is obliged to sustain an expensive
competition, notwithstanding its tastes for economy.
/5-7/
The State of Ohio, which contains a million of inhabitants,
gives its Governor a salary of only $1,200 a year.
/5-8/
To render this assertion perfectly evident, it will
suffice to examine the scale of salaries of the agents of the Federal
Government. I have added the salaries attached to the corresponding
officers in France under the constitutional monarchy to complete the
comparison.
United States
Treasury Department
Messenger ............................ $700
Clerk with lowest salary ............. 1,000
Clerk with highest salary ............ 1,600
Chief Clerk .......................... 2,000
Secretary of State ................... 6,000
The President ........................ 25,000
France
Ministere des Finances
Hussier ........................... 1,500 fr.
Clerk with lowest salary, 1,000 to 1,800 fr.
Clerk with highest salary 3,200 to 8,600 fr.
Secretaire-general ................20,000 fr.
The Minister ......................80,000 fr.
The King ......................12,000,000 fr.
I have perhaps done wrong in selecting France as my standard of
comparison. In France the democratic tendencies of the nation exercise
an ever-increasing influence upon the Government, and the Chambers show
a disposition to raise the low salaries and to lower the principal
ones. Thus, the Minister of Finance, who received 160,000 fr. under the
Empire, receives 80,000 fr. in 1835: the Directeurs-generaux of
Finance, who then received 50,000 fr. now receive only 20,000 fr.
/5-9/
See the American budgets for the cost of indigent citizens
and gratuitous instruction. In 1831 $250,000 were spent in the State of
New York for the maintenance of the poor, and at least $1,000,000
were devoted to gratuitous instruction. (William's "New York Annual
Register," 1832, pp. 205 and 243.) The State of New York contained only
1,900,000 inhabitants in the year 1830, which is not more than double
the amount of population in the Department du Nord in France.
/5-10/
The Americans, as we have seen, have four separate budgets,
the Union, the States, the Counties, and the Townships having each
severally their own. During my stay in America I made every endeavor
to discover the amount of the public expenditure in the townships and
counties of the principal States of the Union, and I readily obtained
the budget of the larger townships, but I found it quite impossible to
procure that of the smaller ones. I possess, however, some documents
relating to county expenses, which, although incomplete, are still
curious. I have to thank Mr. Richards, Mayor of Philadelphia, for the
budgets of thirteen of the counties of Pennsylvania, viz., Lebanon,
Centre, Franklin, Fayette, Montgomery, Luzerne, Dauphin, Butler,
Alleghany, Columbia, Northampton, Northumberland, and Philadelphia,
for the year 1830. Their population at that time consisted of 495,207
inhabitants. On looking at the map of Pennsylvania, it will be seen
that these thirteen counties are scattered in every direction, and so
generally affected by the causes which usually influence the condition
of a country, that they may easily be supposed to furnish a correct
average of the financial state of the counties of Pennsylvania in
general; and thus, upon reckoning that the expenses of these counties
amounted in the year 1830 to about $361,650, or nearly 75 cents for each
inhabitant, and calculating that each of them contributed in the same
year about $2.55 towards the Union, and about 75 cents to the State of
Pennsylvania, it appears that they each contributed as their share
of all the public expenses (except those of the townships) the sum of
$4.05. This calculation is doubly incomplete, as it applies only to a
single year and to one part of the public charges; but it has at least
the merit of not being conjectural.
/5-11/
Those who have
attempted to draw a comparison between the expenses of France and
America have at once perceived that no such comparison could be drawn
between the total expenditure of the two countries; but they have
endeavored to contrast detached portions of this expenditure. It may
readily be shown that this second system is not at all less defective
than the first. If I attempt to compare the French budget with the
budget of the Union, it must be remembered that the latter embraces much
fewer objects than then central Government of the former country, and
that the expenditure must consequently be much smaller. If I contrast
the budgets of the Departments with those of the States which constitute
the Union, it must be observed that, as the power and control exercised
by the States is much greater than that which is exercised by the
Departments, their expenditure is also more considerable. As for the
budgets of the counties, nothing of the kind occurs in the French
system of finances; and it is, again, doubtful whether the corresponding
expenses should be referred to the budget of the State or to those of
the municipal divisions. Municipal expenses exist in both countries,
but they are not always analogous. In America the townships discharge a
variety of offices which are reserved in France to the Departments or
to the State. It may, moreover, be asked what is to be understood by the
municipal expenses of America. The organization of the municipal bodies
or townships differs in the several States. Are we to be guided by what
occurs in New England or in Georgia, in Pennsylvania or in the State
of Illinois? A kind of analogy may very readily be perceived between
certain budgets in the two countries; but as the elements of which
they are composed always differ more or less, no fair comparison can
be instituted between them.
/5-12/
Even if we knew the exact pecuniary contributions of every
French and American citizen to the coffers of the State, we should only
come at a portion of the truth. Governments do not only demand supplies
of money, but they call for personal services, which may be looked upon
as equivalent to a given sum. When a State raises an army, besides the
pay of the troops, which is furnished by the entire nation, each soldier
must give up his time, the value of which depends on the use he might
make of it if he were not in the service. The same remark applies to the
militia; the citizen who is in the militia devotes a certain portion
of valuable time to the maintenance of the public peace, and he does in
reality surrender to the State those earnings which he is prevented from
gaining. Many other instances might be cited in addition to these. The
governments of France and of America both levy taxes of this kind,
which weigh upon the citizens; but who can estimate with accuracy their
relative amount in the two countries?
This, however, is not the last of the difficulties which prevent us from
comparing the expenditure of the Union with that of France. The French
Government contracts certain obligations which do not exist in America,
and vice versa. The French Government pays the clergy; in America the
voluntary principle prevails. In America there is a legal provision for
the poor; in France they are abandoned to the charity of the public. The
French public officers are paid by a fixed salary; in America they are
allowed certain perquisites. In France contributions in kind take place
on very few roads; in America upon almost all the thoroughfares: in
the former country the roads are free to all travellers; in the
latter turnpikes abound. All these differences in the manner in which
contributions are levied in the two countries enhance the difficulty of
comparing their expenditure; for there are certain expenses which the
citizens would not be subject to, or which would at any rate be much
less considerable, if the State did not take upon itself to act in the
name of the public.
/5-13/
See the details in the Budget of the French Minister of
Marine; and for America, the National Calendar of 1833, p. 228.
/5-14/
One of the most singular of these occurrences was the
resolution which the Americans took of temporarily abandoning the use of
tea. Those who know that men usually cling more to their habits than
to their life will doubtless admire this great though obscure sacrifice
which was made by a whole people.
/5-15/
"The President," says the Constitution, Art. II, sect. 2,
Section 2, "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present
concur." The reader is reminded that the senators are returned for a
term of six years, and that they are chosen by the legislature of each
State.
/5-16/
See the fifth volume of Marshall's "Life of Washington." In
a government constituted like that of the United States, he says,
"it is impossible for the chief magistrate, however firm he may be, to
oppose for any length of time the torrent of popular opinion; and the
prevalent opinion of that day seemed to incline to war. In fact, in
the session of Congress held at the time, it was frequently seen that
Washington had lost the majority in the House of Representatives." The
violence of the language used against him in public was extreme, and in
a political meeting they did not scruple to compare him indirectly to
the treacherous Arnold. "By the opposition," says Marshall, "the friends
of the administration were declared to be an aristocratic and corrupt
faction, who, from a desire to introduce monarchy, were hostile to
France and under the influence of Britain; that they were a paper
nobility, whose extreme sensibility at every measure which threatened
the funds, induced a tame submission to injuries and insults, which the
interests and honor of the nation required them to resist."
/6-1/
At the time of my stay in the United States the temperance
societies already consisted of more than 270,000 members, and their
effect had been to diminish the consumption of fermented liquors by
500,000 gallons per annum in the State of Pennsylvania alone.
/6-2/
The same remark was made at Rome under the first Caesars.
Montesquieu somewhere alludes to the excessive despondency of certain
Roman citizens who, after the excitement of political life, were all at
once flung back into the stagnation of private life.
/7-1/
We observed, in examining the Federal Constitution, that
the efforts of the legislators of the Union had been diametrically
opposed to the present tendency. The consequence has been that the
Federal Government is more independent in its sphere than that of the
States. But the Federal Government scarcely ever interferes in any
but external affairs; and the governments of the State are in the
governments of the States are in reality the authorities which direct
society in America.
/7-2/
The legislative acts promulgated by the State of
Massachusetts alone, from the year 1780 to the present time, already
fill three stout volumes; and it must not be forgotten that the
collection to which I allude was published in 1823, when many old laws
which had fallen into disuse were omitted. The State of Massachusetts,
which is not more populous than a department of France, may be
considered as the most stable, the most consistent, and the most
sagacious in its undertakings of the whole Union.
/7-3/
No one will assert that a people cannot forcibly wrong
another people; but parties may be looked upon as lesser nations within
a greater one, and they are aliens to each other: if, therefore, it be
admitted that a nation can act tyrannically towards another nation, it
cannot be denied that a party may do the same towards another party.
/7-4/
A striking instance of the excesses which may be occasioned
by the despotism of the majority occurred at Baltimore in the year 1812.
At that time the war was very popular in Baltimore. A journal which
had taken the other side of the question excited the indignation of
the inhabitants by its opposition. The populace assembled, broke the
printing-presses, and attacked the houses of the newspaper editors. The
militia was called out, but no one obeyed the call; and the only means
of saving the poor wretches who were threatened by the frenzy of the
mob was to throw them into prison as common malefactors. But even this
precaution was ineffectual; the mob collected again during the night,
the magistrates again made a vain attempt to call out the militia, the
prison was forced, one of the newspaper editors was killed upon the
spot, and the others were left for dead; the guilty parties were
acquitted by the jury when they were brought to trial.
I said one day to an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, "Be so good as to
explain to me how it happens that in a State founded by Quakers, and
celebrated for its toleration, freed blacks are not allowed to exercise
civil rights. They pay the taxes; is it not fair that they should have a
vote?"
"You insult us," replied my informant, "if you imagine that our
legislators could have committed so gross an act of injustice and
intolerance."
"What! then the blacks possess the right of voting in this county?"
"Without the smallest doubt."
"How comes it, then, that at the polling-booth this morning I did not
perceive a single negro in the whole meeting?"
"This is not the fault of the law: the negroes have an undisputed right
of voting, but they voluntarily abstain from making their appearance."
"A very pretty piece of modesty on their parts!" rejoined I.
"Why, the truth is, that they are not disinclined to vote, but they are
afraid of being maltreated; in this country the law is sometimes unable
to maintain its authority without the support of the majority. But in
this case the majority entertains very strong prejudices against the
blacks, and the magistrates are unable to protect them in the exercise
of their legal privileges."
"What! then the majority claims the right not only of making the laws,
but of breaking the laws it has made?"
/7-5/
This power may be centred in an assembly, in which case
it will be strong without being stable; or it may be centred in an
individual, in which case it will be less strong, but more stable.
/7-6/
I presume that it is scarcely necessary to remind the
reader here, as well as throughout the remainder of this chapter, that
I am speaking, not of the Federal Government, but of the several
governments of each State, which the majority controls at its pleasure.
/7-7/
March 15, 1789.
/8-1/
See . on the "Judicial Power in the United States."
/8-2/
The investigation of trial by jury as a judicial
institution, and the appreciation of its effects in the United States,
together with the advantages the Americans have derived from it, would
suffice to form a book, and a book upon a very useful and curious
subject. The State of Louisiana would in particular afford the curious
phenomenon of a French and English legislation, as well as a French and
English population, which are gradually combining with each other. See
the "Digeste des Lois de la Louisiane," in two volumes; and the "Traite
sur les Regles des Actions civiles," printed in French and English at
New Orleans in 1830.
/8-3/
All the English and American jurists are unanimous upon
this head. Mr. Story, judge of the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaks, in his "Treatise on the Federal Constitution," of the advantages
of trial by jury in civil cases:—"The inestimable privilege of a
trial by jury in civil cases—a privilege scarcely inferior to that
in criminal cases, which is counted by all persons to be essential to
political and civil liberty. . . ." (Story, book iii., chap. xxxviii.)
/8-4/
If it were our province to point out the utility of the
jury as a judicial institution in this place, much might be said, and
the following arguments might be brought forward amongst others:—
By introducing the jury into the business of the courts you are enabled
to diminish the number of judges, which is a very great advantage. When
judges are very numerous, death is perpetually thinning the ranks of
the judicial functionaries, and laying places vacant for newcomers. The
ambition of the magistrates is therefore continually excited, and they
are naturally made dependent upon the will of the majority, or the
individual who fills up the vacant appointments; the officers of the
court then rise like the officers of an army. This state of things is
entirely contrary to the sound administration of justice, and to the
intentions of the legislator. The office of a judge is made inalienable
in order that he may remain independent: but of what advantage is it
that his independence should be protected if he be tempted to sacrifice
it of his own accord? When judges are very numerous many of them must
necessarily be incapable of performing their important duties, for a
great magistrate is a man of no common powers; and I am inclined to
believe that a half-enlightened tribunal is the worst of all instruments
for attaining those objects which it is the purpose of courts of justice
to accomplish. For my own part, I had rather submit the decision of a
case to ignorant jurors directed by a skilful judge than to judges a
majority of whom are imperfectly acquainted with jurisprudence and with
the laws.
/8-5/
An important remark must, however, be made. Trial by jury
does unquestionably invest the people with a general control over the
actions of citizens, but it does not furnish means of exercising this
control in all cases, or with an absolute authority. When an absolute
monarch has the right of trying offences by his representatives, the
fate of the prisoner is, as it were, decided beforehand. But even if
the people were predisposed to convict, the composition and the
non-responsibility of the jury would still afford some chances favorable
to the protection of innocence.
/8-6/
See Appendix Q.
/8-7/
See Appendix R.
/8-8/
The Federal judges decide upon their own authority almost
all the questions most important to the country.
/9-1/
The United States have no metropolis, but they already
contain several very large cities. Philadelphia reckoned 161,000
inhabitants and New York 202,000 in the year 1830. The lower orders
which inhabit these cities constitute a rabble even more formidable
than the populace of European towns. They consist of freed blacks in the
first place, who are condemned by the laws and by public opinion to
a hereditary state of misery and degradation. They also contain a
multitude of Europeans who have been driven to the shores of the New
World by their misfortunes or their misconduct; and these men inoculate
the United States with all our vices, without bringing with them any of
those interests which counteract their baneful influence. As inhabitants
of a country where they have no civil rights, they are ready to turn all
the passions which agitate the community to their own advantage; thus,
within the last few months serious riots have broken out in Philadelphia
and in New York. Disturbances of this kind are unknown in the rest of
the country, which is nowise alarmed by them, because the population of
the cities has hitherto exercised neither power nor influence over the
rural districts. Nevertheless, I look upon the size of certain American
cities, and especially on the nature of their population, as a real
danger which threatens the future security of the democratic republics
of the New World; and I venture to predict that they will perish from
this circumstance unless the government succeeds in creating an armed
force, which, whilst it remains under the control of the majority of the
nation, will be independent of the town population, and able to repress
its excesses.
/9-2/
In New England the estates are exceedingly small, but they
are rarely subjected to further division.
/9-3/
The New York "Spectator" of August 23, 1831, relates the
fact in the following terms:—"The Court of Common Pleas of Chester
county (New York) a few days since rejected a witness who declared his
disbelief in the existence of God. The presiding judge remarked that
he had not before been aware that there was a man living who did not
believe in the existence of God; that this belief constituted the
sanction of all testimony in a court of justice, and that he knew of
no cause in a Christian country where a witness had been permitted to
testify without such belief."
/9-4/
Unless this term be applied to the functions which many
of them fill in the schools. Almost all education is entrusted to the
clergy.
/9-5/
See the Constitution of New York, art. 7, Section 4:— "And
whereas the ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated
to the service of God and the care of souls, and ought not to be
diverted from the great duties of their functions: therefore no minister
of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall at any
time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever, be eligible
to, or capable of holding, any civil or military office or place within
this State."
See also the constitutions of North Carolina, art. 31; Virginia; South
Carolina, art. I, Section 23; Kentucky, art. 2, Section 26; Tennessee,
art. 8, Section I; Louisiana, art. 2, Section 22.
/9-6/
I travelled along a portion of the frontier of the United
States in a sort of cart which was termed the mail. We passed, day and
night, with great rapidity along the roads which were scarcely marked
out, through immense forests; when the gloom of the woods became
impenetrable the coachman lighted branches of fir, and we journeyed
along by the light they cast. From time to time we came to a hut in
the midst of the forest, which was a post-office. The mail dropped an
enormous bundle of letters at the door of this isolated dwelling, and
we pursued our way at full gallop, leaving the inhabitants of the
neighboring log houses to send for their share of the treasure.
/9-7/
In 1832 each inhabitant of Michigan paid a sum equivalent
to 1 fr. 22 cent. (French money) to the post-office revenue, and each
inhabitant of the Floridas paid 1 fr. 5 cent. (See "National Calendar,"
1833, p. 244.) In the same year each inhabitant of the Departement du
Nord paid 1 fr. 4 cent. to the revenue of the French post-office. (See
the "Compte rendu de l'administration des Finances," 1833, p. 623.)
Now the State of Michigan only contained at that time 7 inhabitants
per square league and Florida only 5: the public instruction and the
commercial activity of these districts is inferior to that of most of
the States in the Union, whilst the Departement du Nord, which contains
3,400 inhabitants per square league, is one of the most enlightened and
manufacturing parts of France.
/9-8/
I remind the reader of the general signification which
I give to the word "manners," namely, the moral and intellectual
characteristics of social man taken collectively.
The text of Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville continues with more of Volume One, Part Two