CHAPTER VI. Of Conspiracies.
It were an omission not to say something on the subject of conspiracies,
these being a source of much danger both to princes and to private men.
For we see that many more princes have lost their lives and states
through these than in open warfare; power to wage open war upon a prince
being conceded to few, whereas power to conspire against him is denied
to none. On the other hand, since conspiracies are attended at every
stage by difficulties and dangers, no more hazardous or desperate
undertakings can be engaged in by any private citizen; whence it comes
that while many conspiracies are planned, few effect their object.
Wherefore, to put princes on their guard against these dangers, and to
make subjects more cautious how they take part in them, and rather learn
to live content under whatever government fortune has assigned them,
I shall treat of them at length, without omitting any noteworthy
circumstance which may serve for the instruction of either. Though,
indeed, this is a golden sentence Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein he says
that "the past should have our reverence, the present our obedience,
and that we should wish for good princes, but put up with any."[1]
For assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring ruin both on
himself and on his country.
But, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of all to examine
against whom conspiracies are directed; and we shall find that men
conspire either against their country or their prince; and it is of
these two kinds of conspiracy that at present I desire to speak. For
of conspiracies which have for their object the surrender of cities to
enemies who are besieging them, and of all others contrived for like
ends, I have already said enough.
First, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed
against a prince, and begin by inquiring into their causes, which are
manifold, but of which one is more momentous than all the rest; I
mean, the being hated by the whole community. For it may reasonably
be assumed, that when a prince has drawn upon himself this universal
hatred, he must also have given special offence to particular men, which
they will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will be augmented
by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen to have
incurred. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of public
hatred. How he is to do so I need not stop here to explain, having
discussed the matter already in another place; but if he can guard
against this, offence given to particular men will expose him to but few
attacks. One reason being, that there are few men who think so much of
an injury done them as to run great risks to revenge it; another, that
assuming them to have both the disposition and the courage to avenge
themselves, they are restrained by the universal favour which they see
entertained towards the prince.
Injuries are either to a man's life, to his property, or to his honour.
As regards the first, they who threaten injuries to life incur more
danger than they who actually inflict them; or rather, while great
danger is incurred in threatening, none at all is incurred from
inflicting such injuries. For the dead are past thinking of revenge; and
those who survive, for the most part leave such thoughts to the dead.
But he whose life is threatened, finding himself forced by necessity
either to do or suffer, becomes a man most dangerous to the prince, as
shall be fully explained hereafter.
After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more
than any others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he can
never strip a man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some
weapon wherewith to redress his wrongs, nor ever so far dishonour him as
to quell the stubborn spirit which prompts revenge. Of all dishonours
those done to the women of a household are the worst; after which come
such personal indignities as nerved the arm of Pausanias against Philip
of Macedon, and of many another against other princes; and, in our own
days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti to conspire
against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than that Pandolfo, who had given him
his daughter to wife, afterwards took her from him, as presently shall
be told. Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi to conspire against
the Medici, was the law passed by the latter depriving them of the
inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei.
Another most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire
men feel to free their country from a usurper. This it was which
impelled Brutus and Cassius to conspire against Caesar, and countless
others against such tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius, and the like.
Against this humour no tyrant can guard, except by laying down his
tyranny; which as none will do, few escape an unhappy end. Whence the
verses of Juvenal:—
 "Few tyrants die a peaceful death, and few
 The kings who visit Proserpine's dread lord,
 Unscathed by wounds and blood."[2]
Great, as I have said already, are the dangers which men run in
conspiring; for at all times they are in peril, whether in contriving,
in executing, or after execution. And since in conspiracies either many
are engaged, or one only (for although it cannot properly be said of
one man that he conspires, there may exist in him the fixed resolve
to put the prince to death), it is only the solitary plotter who escapes
the first of these three stages of danger. For he runs no risk before
executing his design, since as he imparts it to none, there is none to
bring it to the ear of the prince. A deliberate resolve like this may be
conceived by a person in any rank of life, high or low, base or noble,
and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince. For every one must,
at some time or other, have leave to speak to the prince, and whoever
has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his design. Pausanias, of
whom we have made mention so often, slew Philip of Macedon as he walked
between his son and his son-in-law to the temple, surrounded by a
thousand armed guards. Pausanias indeed was noble, and known to the
prince, but Ferdinand of Spain was stabbed in the neck by a poor and
miserable Spaniard; and though the wound was not mortal, it sufficed
to show that neither courage nor opportunity were wanting to the
would-be-assassin. A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew his scimitar on
Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if he did not wound him,
it was from no lack either of daring or of opportunity. And I believe
that there are many who in their minds desire the deed, no punishment or
danger attending the mere wish, though there be but few who dare do it.
For since few or none who venture, escape death, few are willing to go
forward to certain destruction.
But to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are
engaged, I affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have
been contrived by men of great station, or by those who have been on
terms of close intimacy with the prince, since no others, not being
downright madmen, would ever think of conspiring. For men of humble
rank, and such as are not the intimates of their prince, are neither
fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such
attempts. Because, in the first place, men of low degree will never find
any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join in their schemes
by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks; wherefore,
so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three, they are
betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate enough to have no
traitor of their number, they will be so hampered in the execution of
their plot by the want of easy access to the prince, that they are sure
to perish in the mere attempt. For if even men of great position, who
have ready access to the prince, succumb to the difficulties which I
shall presently notice, those difficulties must be infinitely increased
in the case of men who are without these advantages. And because
when life and property are at stake men are not utterly reckless, on
perceiving themselves to be weak they grow cautious, and though cursing
the tyrant in their hearts, are content to endure him, and to wait until
some one of higher station than they, comes forward to redress their
wrongs. So that should we ever find these weaklings attempting anything,
we may commend their courage rather than their prudence.
We see, however, that the great majority of conspirators have been
persons of position and the familiars of their prince, and that their
plots have been as often the consequence of excessive indulgence as
of excessive injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus,
Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius; all of whom
had been raised by their masters to such wealth, honours, and dignities,
that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the imperial name.
That they might not lack this also, they fell to conspiring against
their prince; but in every instance their conspiracies had the end which
their ingratitude deserved.
The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the
conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d'Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, lord
of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero, and
loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to this,
in our own days, was the conspiracy of Coppola against King Ferdinand of
Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of power that he seemed to
himself to have everything but sovereignty; in seeking to obtain which
he lost his life; though if any plot entered into by a man of great
position could be expected to succeed, this certainly might, being
contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one who had the
amplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of power
which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the
execution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to
add prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim.
The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought more
to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to whom
he has done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which the
former have in abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in
both, lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of
revenge. Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with so much
authority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and
theirs; that between the two something be still left them to desire.
Otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who
have been named above.
But to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be
necessary that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as
have ready access to the prince, we have next to consider what have been
the results of their plots, and to trace the causes which have made them
succeed or fail. Now, as I have said already, we find that conspiracies
are attended by danger at three stages: before during, and after their
execution; for which reason very few of them have had a happy issue;
it being next to impossible to surmount all these different dangers
successfully. And to begin with those which are incurred beforehand,
and which are graver than all the rest, I say that he must be both very
prudent and very fortunate who, when contriving a conspiracy, does not
suffer his secret to be discovered.
Conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made, or by
conjecture. Disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of those
to whom you communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked for,
because you can impart your plans only to such persons as you believe
ready to face death on your behalf, or to those who are discontented
with the prince. Of men whom you can trust thus implicitly, one or two
may be found; but when you have to open your designs to many, they
cannot all be of this nature; and their goodwill towards you must be
extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and by fear of punishment.
Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in respect of the love which
they imagine others bear them, nor can ever be sure of it until they
have put it to the proof. But to make proof of it in a matter like this
is very perilous; and even if you have proved it already, and found it
true in some other dangerous trial, you cannot assume that there will be
the same fidelity here, since this far transcends every other kind of
danger. Again, if you gauge a man's fidelity by his discontent with the
prince, you may easily deceive yourself; for so soon as you have taken
this discontented man into your confidence, you have supplied him with
the means whereby he may become contented; so that either his hatred
of the prince must be great indeed, or your influence over him
extraordinary, if it keep him faithful. Hence it comes that so many
conspiracies have been discovered and crushed in their earliest stage,
and that when the secret is preserved among many accomplices for any
length of time, it is looked on as a miracle; as in the case of the
conspiracy of Piso against Nero, and, in our own days, in that of the
Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici; which last, though more
than fifty persons were privy to it, was not discovered until it came to
be carried out.
Conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when
he talks so indiscreetly that some servant, or other person not in the
plot, overhears him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when
treating with the envoys of Tarquin, were overheard by a slave, who
became their accuser; or else through your own weakness in imparting
your secret to some woman or boy whom you love, or to some other such
light person; as when Dymnus, who was one of those who conspired with
Philotas against Alexander the Great, revealed the plot to Nicomachus, a
youth whom he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and Cebalinus the king.
Of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of
Piso against Nero; for Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day
before he was to kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves and
gave them money, and bade Milichus, his freedman, sharpen his old rusty
dagger, and have bandages ready for binding up wounds. From all which
preparations Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused
Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested, and with him
Natalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before had been seen
to speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two differed
in their account of what then passed between them, they were put to the
torture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was
brought to light, to the ruin of all concerned.
Against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible
so to guard as that either through treachery, want of caution, or
levity, the secret shall not be found out, whenever more than three or
four persons are privy to it. And whenever more than one conspirator is
arrested, the plot is certain to be detected, because no two persons can
perfectly agree in a false account of what has passed between them. If
only one be taken, should he be a man of resolute courage, he may refuse
to implicate his comrades; but they on their part must have no less
courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray themselves by
flight; for if courage be absent anywhere, whether in him who is taken
or in those still at large, the conspiracy is revealed. And what is
related by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy against
Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary, namely, that on
the capture of one of the conspirators, named Theodorus, he, with great
fortitude, withheld the names of all his accomplices, and accused
friends of the tyrant; while his companions, on their part, trusted so
completely in his courage, that not one of them quitted Syracuse or
showed any sign of fear.
All these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance of a plot,
must be passed through before you come to its execution; or if you would
escape them, you must observe the following precautions: Your first
and surest, nay, to say truth, your only safeguard, is to leave your
accomplices no time to accuse you; for which reason you must impart the
affair to them, only at the moment when you mean it to be carried out,
and not before. Those who have followed this course have wholly escaped
the preliminary dangers of conspiracies, and, generally speaking, the
others also; indeed, I may say that they have all succeeded, and that it
is open to every prudent man to act as they did. It will be enough to
give two instances of plots effected in this way. Nelematus, unable to
endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of Epirus, assembling many
of his friends and kinsmen in his house, exhorted them to free their
country; and when some of them asked for time to consider and mature
their plans, he bade his slaves close the doors, and told those
assembled that unless they swore to go at once and do as he directed
he would make them over to Aristotimus as prisoners. Alarmed by his
threats, they bound themselves by a solemn oath, and going forth at once
and without delay, successfully carried out his bidding. A certain Magus
having fraudulently usurped the throne of Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of
that realm, discovering the fraud, disclosed it to six others of the
chief nobility, telling them that it behoved them to free the kingdom
from the tyranny of this impostor. And when some among them asked for
time, Darius, who was one of the six summoned by Ortanes, stood up and
said, "Either we go at once to do this deed, or I go to the Magus to
accuse you all." Whereupon, all rising together, without time given to
any to change his mind, they went forth and succeeded in effecting their
end. Not unlike these instances was the plan taken by the Etolians to
rid themselves of Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence of
succouring him, they sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen, with two
hundred foot soldiers and thirty horsemen. For they imparted their real
design to Alasamenes only, charging the rest, under pain of exile, to
obey him in whatever he commanded. Alasamenes repaired to Sparta, and
never divulged his commission till the time came for executing it; and
so succeeded in putting Nabis to death.
It was, therefore, by the precautions they observed, that the persons
of whom I have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the
contrivance of conspiracies; and any following their example may expect
the like good fortune. And that all may learn to do as they did I shall
notice the case of Piso, of which mention has before been made. By
reason of his rank, his reputation, and the intimate terms on which he
lived with Nero, who trusted him without reserve, and would often come
to his garden to sup with him, Piso was able to gain the friendship of
many persons of spirit and courage, and well fitted in every way to take
part in his plot against the emperor, which, under these circumstances,
might easily have been carried out. For when Nero came to his garden,
Piso could readily have communicated his design to those friends of his,
and with suitable words have encouraged them to do what, in fact, they
would not have had time to withdraw from, and was certain to succeed.
And were we to examine all similar attempts, it would be seen that there
are few which might not have been effected in the manner shown. But
since most men are very ignorant of practical affairs, they commit the
gravest blunders, especially in matters which lie, as this does, a
little way out of the beaten track.
Wherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if he can help it, to
communicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed; or if
he must communicate it, then to some one man only, with whom he has long
been intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings as
himself. To find one such person is far easier than to find several,
and, at the same time, involves less risk; for though this one man play
you false, you are not left altogether without resource, as you are when
your accomplices are numerous. For I have heard it shrewdly said that
to one man you may impart anything, since, unless you have been led to
commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as far as his assertion.
Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there is nothing so
damning as a letter under your own hand.
Plautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the Emperor Severus and
his son Caracalla, intrusted the business to the tribune Saturninus,
who, being more disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the same
time afraid that, if it came to laying a charge, Plautianus might be
believed sooner than he, asked him for a written authority, that his
commission might be credited. Blinded by ambition, Plautianus complied,
and forthwith was accused by Saturninus and found guilty; whereas, but
for that written warrant, together with other corroborating proofs,
he must have escaped by his bold denial of the charge. Against the
testimony of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless
convicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial proof
against which you must guard. A woman, named Epicharis, who had formerly
been a mistress of Nero, was privy to Piso's conspiracy, and thinking it
might be useful to have the help of a certain captain of triremes whom
Nero had among his body-guards, she acquainted him with the plot, but
not with the names of the plotters. This fellow, turning traitor, and
accusing Epicharis to Nero, so stoutly did she deny the charge, that
Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let her go.
In imparting a plot to a single person there are, therefore, two risks:
one, that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you; the
other, that if arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt, he
may, on being convicted, in the hope to escape punishment, betray you.
But in neither of these dangers are you left without a defence; since
you may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice of your
accuser, and the other by alleging that the witness his been forced by
torture to say what is untrue. The wisest course, however, is to impart
your design to none, but to act like those who have been mentioned
above; or if you impart it, then to one only: for although even in this
course there be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than when
many are admitted to your confidence.
A case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is where an emergency,
so urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety,
constrains you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you.
A necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two
instances may suffice to show. Among the closest friends and intimates
of the Emperor Commodus, were two captains of the pretorian guards,
Letus and Electus, while among the most favoured of his distresses was
a certain Martia. But because these three often reproved him for his
manner of living, as disgraceful to himself and to his station, he
resolved to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along with
those of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next
night, in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed. But on his
going to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his, while playing about
his room and on his bed, found the list, and coming out of the chamber
with it in his hand, was met by Martia, who took it from him, and on
reading it and finding what it contained, sent for Letus and Electus.
And all three recognizing the danger in which they stood, resolved to be
beforehand with the tyrant, and losing no time, murdered him that very
night.
The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with
him Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his
prefect. But because princes who are not themselves good are always
afraid lest others treat them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote to his
friend Maternianus in Rome to learn from the astrologers whether any
man had ambitious designs upon the empire, and to send him word.
Maternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained
by Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the emperor, fell into the
hands of Macrinus, who, seeing when he read it that he must either put
Caracalla to death before further letters arrived from Rome, or else die
himself, committed the business to a centurion, named Martialis, whom
he trusted, and whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few days
before, who succeeded in killing the emperor.
We see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has
almost the same results as the method already noticed as followed by
Nelematus of Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at the outset
of this Discourse, that the threats of princes expose them to greater
danger than the wrongs they actually inflict, and lead to more active
conspiracies: and, therefore, that a prince should be careful not to
threaten; since men are either to be treated kindly or else got rid
of, but never brought to such a pass that they have to choose between
slaying and being slain.
As to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either
from some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the
part of him who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls
into through want of foresight, or from his not giving the affair its
finishing stroke, as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put
to death. Now, nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance in human
affairs, as to be forced, at a moment's notice and without time allowed
for reflection, to vary your plan of action and adopt a different one
from that fixed on at the first. And if such changes cause confusion
anywhere, it is in matters appertaining to war, and in enterprises of
the kind we are now speaking of; for in such affairs as these, there
is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the exact thing
intrusted to them. But when men have for many days together turned their
whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a certain order,
and the way and order are suddenly altered, it is impossible but that
they should be disconcerted and the whole scheme ruined. For which
reason, it is far better to do everything in accordance with the
preconcerted plan, though it be seen to be attended with some
disadvantages, than, in order to escape these, to involve yourself in
an infinity of dangers. And this will happen when you depart from your
original design without time given to form a new one. For when time is
given you may manage as you please.
The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici is
well known. The scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal
S. Giorgio, at which the brothers should be put to death. To each of
the conspirators a part was assigned: to one the murder, to another the
seizure of the palace, while a third was to ride through the streets and
call on the people to free themselves. But it so chanced that at a time
when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were all assembled in the
cathedral church of Florence to hear High Mass, it became known
that Giuliano would not be present at the banquet; whereupon the
conspirators, laying their heads together, resolved to do in church what
they were to have done elsewhere. This, however, deranged the whole
scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would have no hand in the
murder if it was to be done in a church; and the whole distribution of
parts had in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom the new
parts were assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds
to their new tasks, they managed matters so badly that they were
overpowered in their attempt.
Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or
from his being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty
and awe attend the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he
softens or dismays his executioners. When Caius Marius was taken by the
people of Minturnum, the slave sent in to slay him, overawed by the
bearing of the man, and by the memories which his name called up, became
unnerved, and powerless to perform his office. And if this influence was
exercised by one who was a prisoner, and in chains, and overwhelmed by
adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be inspired by a prince
who is free and uncontrolled, surrounded by his retinue and by all the
pomp and splendour of his station; whose dignity confounds, and whose
graciousness conciliates.
Certain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king of Thrace, fixed a day
for his murder, and assembled at the place appointed, whither the king
had already come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him, and all
departed without attempting anything against him or knowing why they
refrained; each blaming the others. And more than once the same folly
was repeated, until the plot getting wind, they were taken and punished
for what they might have done, yet durst not do.
Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him,
employing as their tool a certain priest named Giennes, a singing-man in
the service of the Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought the
Duke into their company, so that they had full opportunity to make away
with him. Yet neither of them ever ventured to strike the blow; till
at last, their scheme being discovered, they paid the penalty of their
combined cowardice and temerity. Such irresolution can only have arisen
from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or touched by
his graciousness.
In the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors and mishaps arise
from a failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject, when,
losing self-control, they are led in their bewilderment to do and say
what they ought not. That men are thus confounded, and thrown off their
balance, could not be better shown than in the words of Titus Livius,
where he describes the behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian, at the time
when he resolved on the death of Nabis the Spartan, of whom I have
spoken before. For when the time to act came, and he had disclosed to
his followers what they had to do, Livius represents him as "collecting
his thoughts which had grown confused by dwelling on so desperate an
enterprise." For it is impossible for any one, though of the most
steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to handle deadly
weapons, not to be perturbed at such a moment. For which reason we
should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had
experience in similar affairs, and trust no others though reputed of the
truest courage. For in these grave undertakings, no one who is without
such experience, however bold and resolute, is to be trusted.
The confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon
from your hand, or to use words which will have the same results.
Quintianus being commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to slay him,
lay in wait for him at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and rushing
upon him with a drawn dagger, cried out, "The senate sends you this;"
which words caused him to be seized before his blow descended. In like
manner Messer Antonio of Volterra, who as we have elsewhere seen was
told off to kill Lorenzo de' Medici, exclaimed as he approached him,
"Ah traitor!" and this exclamation proved the salvation of Lorenzo and
the ruin of that conspiracy.
For the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a single ruler may
readily break down in its execution; but a conspiracy against two rulers
is not only difficult, but so hazardous that its success is almost
hopeless. For to effect like actions, at the same time, in different
places, is well-nigh impossible; nor can they be effected at different
times, if you would not have one counteract another. So that if
conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent and dangerous, to
conspire against two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate.
And were it not for the respect in which I hold the historian, I could
not credit as possible what Herodian relates of Plautianus, namely,
that he committed to the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying
single-handed both Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different
places; for the thing is so opposed to reason that on no other authority
could I be induced to accept it as true.
Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants
of Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged
him. Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired
against the despots Clearchus and Satirus. Clearchus fell, but Satirus
survived and avenged him. The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often,
succeeded in murdering Giuliano only. From such conspiracies, therefore,
as are directed against more heads than one, all should abstain; for no
good is to be got from them, whether for ourselves, for our country, or
for any one else. On the contrary, when those conspired against escape,
they become harsher and more unsufferable than before, as, in the
examples given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to know. True
it is that the conspiracy contrived by Pelopidas for the liberation of
his country, had to encounter every conceivable hindrance, and yet had
the happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not with two tyrants only,
but with ten; and so far from having their confidence, could not, being
an outlaw, even approach them. And yet he succeeded in coming to Thebes,
in putting the tyrants to death, and in freeing his country. But
whatever he did was done with the aid of one of the counsellors of
the tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he had all facilities for
executing his design. Let none, however, take this case as a pattern;
for that it was in truth a desperate attempt, and its success a marvel,
was and is the opinion of all historians, who speak of it as a thing
altogether extraordinary and unexampled.
The execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or
unforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to
be carried out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates were
to slay Caesar, it so happened that Caesar talked for a great while with
Cneus Pompilius Lenas, one of the conspirators; which some of the others
observing, were in terror that Pompilius was divulging the conspiracy to
Caesar; whose life they would therefore have attempted then and there,
without waiting his arrival in the senate house, had they not been
reassured by seeing that when the conference ended he showed no sign of
unusual emotion. False alarms of this sort are to be taken into account
and allowed for, all the more that they are easily raised. For he who
has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that others are speaking of
him. A word used with a wholly different purpose, may throw his mind
off its balance and lead him to fancy that reference is intended to the
matter he is engaged on, and cause him either to betray the conspiracy
by flight, or to derange its execution by anticipating the time fixed.
And the more there are privy to the conspiracy, the likelier is this to
happen.
As to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they
can only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious.
Giulio Belanti of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate
he bore Pandolfo Petrucci, who had given him his daughter to wife and
afterwards taken her from him, resolved to murder him, and thus chose
his time. Almost every day Pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman,
passing the house of Giulio on the way, who, remarking this, took
measures to have his accomplices ready in his house to kill Pandolfo as
he passed. Wherefore, placing the rest armed within the doorway, one he
stationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo's approach. It so
happened however, that as he came nigh the house, and after the look-out
had given the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who stopped him
to converse; when some of those with him, going on in advance, saw and
heard the gleam and clash of weapons, and so discovered the ambuscade;
whereby Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with his companions had to
fly from Siena. This plot accordingly was marred, and Giulio's schemes
baulked, in consequence of a chance meeting. Against such accidents,
since they are out of the common course of things, no provision can
be made. Still it is very necessary to take into account all that may
happen, and devise what remedies you can.
It now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after
the execution of a plot. These in fact resolve themselves into one,
namely, that some should survive who will avenge the death of the
murdered prince. The part of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son, a
brother, or other kinsman of the deceased, who in the ordinary course of
events might have looked to succeed to the princedom. And such persons
are suffered to live, either from inadvertence, or from some of the
causes noted already, as when Giovann' Andrea of Lampognano, with the
help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan. For the son and
two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge his
death. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held excused,
since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. But when from
carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to live
whose death ought to have been secured, there is no excuse. Certain
conspirators, after murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of Forli, made
prisoners of his wife and of his children who were still very young.
By thinking they could not be safe unless they got possession of the
citadel, which the governor refused to surrender, they obtained a
promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess was named, that on
their permitting her to enter the citadel she would cause it to be
given up to them, her children in the mean time remaining with them as
hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her to enter the citadel.
But no sooner had she got inside than she fell to upbraid them from the
walls with the murder of her husband, and to threaten them with every
kind of vengeance; and to show them how little store she set upon her
children, told them scoffingly that she knew how others could be got. In
the end, the rebels having no leader to advise them, and perceiving too
late the error into which they had been betrayed, had to pay the penalty
of their rashness by perpetual banishment.
But of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot, none
is so much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be well
affected to the prince whom you have put to death. For against this
danger conspirators have no resource which can ensure their safety. Of
this we have example in the case of Caesar, who as he had the love of the
Roman people was by them avenged; for they it was who, by driving
out the conspirators from Rome, were the cause that all of them, at
different times and in different places, came to violent ends.
Conspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take
part in them than conspiracies against princes; since there is less risk
beforehand, and though there be the same danger in their execution,
there is none afterwards. Beforehand, the risks are few, because a
citizen may use means for obtaining power without betraying his wishes
or designs to any; and unless his course be arrested, his designs are
likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws be passed to restrain him, he
may strike out a new path. This is to be understood of a commonwealth
which has to some degree become corrupted; for in one wherein there is
no taint of corruption, there being no soil in which evil seed can grow,
such designs will never suggest themselves to any citizen.
In a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many means and in many
ways aspire to the princedom without risking destruction, both because
republics are slower than princes are to take alarm, are less suspicious
and consequently less cautious, and because they look with greater
reverence upon their great citizens, who are in this way rendered bolder
and more reckless in attacking them. Any one who has read Sallust's
account of the conspiracy of Catiline, must remember how, when that
conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in Rome, but even
made his appearance in the senatehouse, where he was suffered to address
the senate in the most insulting terms,—so scrupulous was that city in
protecting the liberty of all its citizens. Nay, even after he had left
Rome and placed himself at the head of his army, Lentulus and his other
accomplices would not have been imprisoned, had not letters been found
upon them clearly establishing their guilt. Hanno, the foremost citizen
of Carthage, aspiring to absolute power, on the occasion of the marriage
of a daughter contrived a plot for administering poison to the whole
senate and so making himself prince. The scheme being discovered, the
senate took no steps against him beyond passing a law to limit the
expense of banquets and marriage ceremonies. So great was the respect
they paid to his quality.
True, the execution of a plot against your country is attended
with greater difficulty and danger, since it seldom happens that,
in conspiring against so many, your own resources are sufficient by
themselves; for it is not every one who, like Caesar, Agathocles, or
Cleomenes, is at the head of an army, so as to be able at a stroke, and
by open force to make himself master of his country. To such as these,
doubtless, the path is safe and easy enough; but others who have not
such an assembled force ready at their command, must effect their ends
either by stratagem and fraud, or with the help of foreign troops.
Of such stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of
Pisistratus the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and thereby
gaining the favour of his fellow-citizens, showed himself to them one
morning covered with wounds and blood, declaring that he had been thus
outraged through the jealousy of the nobles, and asking that he might
have an armed guard assigned for his protection. With the authority
which this lent him, he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to
become tyrant of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, on his return
with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed the command of the public
guard, as a mere office of routine which others had declined. Very soon,
however, this armed force gave him so much importance that he became the
supreme ruler of the State. And many others have followed other plans
and methods, and in the course of time, and without incurring danger,
have achieved their aim.
Conspirators against their country, whether trusting to their own forces
or to foreign aid, have had more or less success in proportion as they
have been favoured by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just now, was
overthrown. Hanno, who has also been mentioned, failing to accomplish
his object by poison, armed his partisans to the number of many
thousands; but both he and they came to an ill end. On the other hand,
certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to become its tyrants, summoned a
Spartan army to their assistance, and usurped the absolute control of
the city. In short, if we examine all the conspiracies which men have
engaged in against their country, we shall find that few or none have
been quelled in their inception, but that all have either succeeded,
or have broken down in their execution. Once executed, they entail no
further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a princedom. For the
man who becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and ordinary dangers
in which a tyranny involves him, and has no remedies against them save
those of which I have already spoken.
This is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies. If
I have noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather
than those wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because,
generally speaking, the method of proceeding is the same in both. It is
true, nevertheless, that conspiracies which are to be carried out by
poison are, by reason of their uncertainty, attended by greater danger.
For since fewer opportunities offer for their execution, you must have
an understanding with persons who can command opportunities. But it is
dangerous to have to depend on others. Again, many causes may hinder a
poisoned draught from proving mortal; as when the murderers of Commodus,
on his vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle him.
Princes, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy, for when a
conspiracy is formed against them, it either carries them off, or
discredits them: since, if it succeeds, they die; while, if it be
discovered, and the conspirators be put to death themselves, it will
always be believed that the whole affair has been trumped up by the
prince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the goods and blood
of those whom he has made away with. Let me not, however, forget to warn
the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is directed, that
on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to punish it, they
endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its character, and after
carefully weighing the strength of the conspirators with their own, on
finding it preponderate, never suffer their knowledge of the plot to
appear until they are ready with a force sufficient to crush it. For
otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will only give the signal for
their destruction. They must strive therefore to seem unconscious of
what is going on; for conspirators who see themselves detected are
driven forward by necessity and will stick at nothing. Of this
precaution we have an example in Roman history, when the officers of the
two legions, who, as has already been mentioned, were left behind to
defend the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired together against the
Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy reaching Rome, Rutilius the
new consul was charged to see to it; who, not to excite the suspicions
of the conspirators, publicly gave out that by order of the senate
the Capuan legions were continued in their station. The conspirators
believing this, and thinking they would have ample time to execute their
plans, made no effort to hasten matters, but remained at their ease,
until they found that the consul was moving one of the two legions to
a distance from the other. This arousing their suspicion, led them to
disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them out.
Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever way
we look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those matters
wherein time seems of little importance, and how active they become when
necessity urges them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth desiring for
their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy, use any
more effectual means to do so, than by artfully holding out to the
conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present itself;
awaiting which, and believing they have time and to spare for what they
have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth all the leisure
needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects these
precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the Duke of
Athens, and with Guglielmo de' Pazzi. For the Duke, who had made himself
tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being conspired against,
without further inquiry into the matter, caused one of the conspirators
to be seized; whereupon the rest at once armed themselves and deprived
him of his government. Guglielmo, again, being commissary in the Val
di Chiana in the year 1501, and learning that a conspiracy was being
hatched in Arezzo to take the town from the Florentines and give it over
to the Vitelli, repaired thither with all haste; and without providing
himself with the necessary forces or giving a thought to the strength of
the conspirators, on the advice of the bishop, his son, had one of them
arrested. Which becoming known to the others, they forthwith rushed to
arms, and taking the town from the Florentines, made Guglielmo their
prisoner. Where, however, conspiracies are weak, they may and should be
put down without scruple or hesitation.
Two methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which have occasionally
been followed in dealing with conspiracies, are in no way to be
commended. One of these was that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom
I have just now spoken, who to have it thought that he confided in the
goodwill of the Florentines, caused a certain man who gave information
of a plot against him, to be put to death. The other was that followed
by Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the intentions of one whom he
suspected, arranged with Calippus, whom he trusted, to pretend to get up
a conspiracy against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped any advantage
from the course he followed. For the one discouraged informers and gave
heart to those who were disposed to conspire, the other prepared an easy
road to his own death, or rather was prime mover in a conspiracy against
himself. As the event showed. For Calippus having free leave to plot
against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he deprived him at once of
his State and life.
[Footnote 1: Tac. Hist. iv. 8.]
[Footnote 2: Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci
Descendunt reges, et sicca morte tiranni.
Juv. Sat. x. 112.]